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As more central banks across Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) move towards inflation control – either in the
form of direct inflation targeting or indirectly through infor-
mal targets – good knowledge of transmission mechanism in
the economy becomes crucial for implementing good poli-
cies. So far the volume of studies in the region devoted to
this issue is not overly impressive. There have been no
attempts made to study the issue in a comparative context
of several economies. 
In the case of CEE, this research field, like many others,
is naturally constrained by at least two important factors.
The first is the lack of data in terms of both length of time
series and of quality and reliability. The second is the con-
stant institutional changes in the studied environment which
renders the different models and techniques structurally
unstable and the results – generally volatile. 
The purpose of this study is to review the existing liter-
ature on transmission mechanism in CEE and put it in a
broader context of the problems related to research on
monetary policy. Also, we attempted to conduct empirical
analysis for 10 transition economies using analogous
methodology for the same sample period 1995-2000. In this
comparative framework a series of Granger causality tests
and impulse response analysis were carried out to asses the
strength of two major transmission channels: interest rate
and exchange rate channel. Also in the empirical part, we
tried to look for the existence of long-run relationships
between the basic set of macroeconomic variables in the
countries under investigation.
The paper is composed as follows. Chapter 2 briefly
reviews the transmission mechanism research in CEE with
special emphasis on the origin of studies, methods used and
general inferences. Then, chapter 3 presents a problem-
based discussion of issues related to transmission mecha-
nism in the special context of transition economies. Goals,
targets and tools of monetary policy as well a exchange rate
regimes are reviewed and discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 pre-
sent empirical results. Chapter 4 describes core inflation
estimates and selection process as well as presents all
remaining variables and tests for the level of integration.
Chapter 5 includes the empirical analysis of transmission
mechanism through Granger causality and impulse respons-
es as well as cointegration analysis. Finally, chapter 7 con-
cludes the paper with summary of results.
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Below we present the compact review of transmission
mechanism research in CEE. Of course, this short review
cannot encompass all papers on this subject, but a conscious
attempt was made to organize a thorough observation of
work done so far. More than 40 papers were reviewed, and
their analysis naturally requires some initial organization.
The papers can be organized along different dimensions,
which include origin of the work (or affiliation of the
authors), method used, focus of the analysis related to the
specific channel or step of monetary transmission covered
by the respective study. These aspects of the literature are
overviewed first. Then some individual papers are present-
ed in short, and finally some generalized findings of the lit-
erature so far are summarized.
Origin of the works and methods used 
Because of the nature of the topic, most of the work
related to monetary transmission is concentrated around
the central banks of the respective countries. In the case of
this study more than two thirds of the papers dealing or at
least touching upon the issues of monetary transmission
have been generated by, published by, or authored by peo-
ple affiliated with central banks. Most of the rest concern
the Baltic countries and are generated by research insti-
tutes, such as the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in
Transition (BOFIT), or the Stockholm Institute of Transition
Economics (SITE) situated in Western countries and focus-
ing on transition issues.
While the interest of central banks and regional research
institutes in the topic is natural and leads to a relatively large
amount of papers, the work is tailored for the needs of the
specific country, region, or central bank. This renders infer-
ences based on the fact that a particular country is in (par-
ticular stage of) transition, but it is difficult to justify them
based on observations in other countries. Work which tran-
scends the national borders in the region of Central and
Eastern Europe is rare, and there have been no attempts to
include the analysis of monetary transmission in all accession
countries in a common framework. If such a framework is
going to be built and used, however, knowledge about the
approaches and findings of previous studies of different
countries in the region is important.
There are at least four ways to approach the issues of
monetary transmission and all of them have been used in
the case of CEECs. One possible approach is to use a less
formal, descriptive, graphic and comparative analyses,
which deal with observation and comparisons of variables
related to monetary transmission and make inferences boil-
ing down to suggestions for stylized facts about monetary
transmission. Ideally, this approach would consist of identi-
fying shocks in the "policy", or monetary environment, vari-
ables, then develop a counterfactual (what would have hap-
pened to the outcome variables in the absence of a shock or
some other valid comparison), compare the actual with the
counterfactual, and draw conclusions. This is the approach
adopted in several papers, such as Babich (2001) for Latvia,
Korhonen (1999) and Garcia-Herrero (1997) for Estonia
and Lithuania's currency boards, Vetlov (2001) for Lithuania.
The more formal approaches involve formulation and
estimation of econometric models using different starting
points and techniques. The starting point usually relate to
basic assumptions about the way the economy works, and
are often constraint by data availability in terms of both
scope and length. Some formal models attempt to avoid
imposition of strong theoretical constraints on the data, and
use a vector autoregressive approach to make inferences
about the effects of monetary policy. This type of approach
includes different variations, such as vector error correction
specifications, variance decompositions, Granger causality
tests, etc. Along these lines are the studies of Nenovski and
Hristov (1998 and 1999) for Bulgaria, Izak (1998) for the
Czech Republic, Csermely and Varro (2000) for Hungary,
Sarajevs (2000) for Latvia, Vetlov (2000) for Lithuania, 
Maliszewski (1999) and Rybiñski (1997) for Poland, Pelines-
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cu and Scutaru (2000a and 2000b) and Popa (1996) for
Romania. This approach is fairly popular because of its lower
requirements with respect to data and due to the possibili-
ty of work with looser underlying assumptions.
Other models consider specific aspects of transmission by
modeling the behavior of specific agents with respect to spe-
cific policy variables, and thus use small structural macroeco-
nomic models with at most several equations. This approach
involves estimations of several equations, reaction functions,
and doing simulations. This category encompasses the work
of Derviz (2000) and Mahadeva and Smidkova (2001) for the
Czech Republic, Pikkani (2000) for Estonia, Csajbok and
Varro (2000) and Arvai and Menczel (2000) for Hungary,
Delakorda (2000) and Drenovec (1999) for Slovenia.
A third type of formal studies recognize the importance
of capturing various links in the monetary transmission
process, and try to develop more detailed large macroeco-
nomic models with more equations. Since the development
of such a model is next to impossible in the transition con-
text due to lack of sufficiently long data series, the only work
which uses this type of approach is the combined research
of Lättemäe (2001) and Pikkani (2001) for Estonia, even
though the system of equations which is actually estimated
is not very large and misses some potentially important sec-
tors such as the labor market.
All methods have relative strengths and weaknesses in
the transition and EU integration context. For example, a
VAR may be very useful in the transition context of short
data series and non-neoclassical characteristics of economic
interaction which make reliance on traditional theoretical
models precarious, but may have problems capturing the
dynamics of institutional change related to the integration
process, and has to be careful about the presence and rele-
vance of structural breaks. The fully developed large macro-
economic models, on the contrary, have the opposite prob-
lems. The data necessary for their operationalization may be
simply unavailable or unreliable, while their underlying
assumptions about the structure of economic behavior and
interaction in these countries may turn out to be utterly
unrealistic.
Focus of the work
Monetary transmission investigates to the link between
changes in the monetary environment and economic
processes. In the context of the countries studied here it is
important to broaden the view from purely monetary pol-
icy actions to overall changes in the monetary environ-
ment. This is due to the fact that three of the ten CEECs
have a monetary regime dominated by currency board
arrangements (CBA), where most of the traditional mone-
tary policy tools are not at the disposal of the respective
central banks. Thus in the CBA context it is difficult to
speak of monetary policy actions, and yet it is still very
important to study the transmission of monetary process-
es and changes to other economic processes. Also, due to
the fact of transition and the ensuing constant institutional
changes, the monetary environment is influenced in impor-
tant ways by many actions which may not be directly
attributed to the monetary authority. This observation is
the basis of Garcia-Herrero's (1997) approach, where
monetary transmission in investigated explicitly in the con-
text of banking crises in several countries in transition,
including the three Baltic states.
Having broadened the perspective, the area covered by
the term "monetary transmission" becomes quite large. One
way to organize this area is by splitting it into specific chan-
nels and steps of transmission. Very broadly, these channels
include an interest rate channel, a credit channel, and an
exchange rate channel (Mishkin, 1995) with many possible
variations and intermediate cases. Two steps of transmission
can be identified here: one related to transmission from the
monetary environment to some intermediate variable such
as lending and deposit rates, credit and monetary aggre-
gates, the other one related to transmission from these
intermediate variables to the ultimate macroeconomic vari-
ables such as aggregate demand and its components, unem-
ployment, inflation, external balances, GDP. The character-
istics of transmission over the two steps may be quite dif-
ferent, and this leads to the necessity to focus separately on
the different steps. All the papers reviewed cover at least a
subset of channels and steps, and most of the channels and
steps of monetary transition have been studied in every
country studied here.
Yet, recent practice (Bank of England 1999, European
Central Bank 2000) suggests that from the point of view of
knowing what happens in the economy and making deci-
sions, the imposition of a framework of specific channels
through which monetary policy works may be too restric-
tive. Ultimately, what is important is the information about
links between monetary conditions and economic process-
es. Detailed specification of transmission channels may limit
the analysis. This remark should be kept in mind when
studying monetary processes in the transition countries.
Regardless of the technique employed and the framework
used, the results should be interpreted and inferences made
with understanding of this limitation.
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Short reviews of selected papers
Special attention to the credit channel of monetary trans-
mission in Bulgaria is drawn in Nenovsky and Hristov (1998).
The author makes use of various unstructured VAR specifi-
cations, using weekly data for 1997-1998. The results indi-
cate that the variation in the government deposit as a quasi
monetary policy instrument has an (negative, as expected
from the setup of the Bulgarian currency board) effect on the
money supply (M3), and also a significant effect on domestic
credit and on the behavior of banks. Credit rationing is
accepted as a hypothesis with respect to the lending to the
private sector by Bulgarian banks. This is accepted as a con-
firmation for the existence of a credit transmission channel in
Bulgaria. Nenovsky and Hristov (1999) then focus on the
second step of transmission and study the link between the
monetary and the real sector variables include different mon-
etary  aggregates, consumer prices, exchange rate, interest
rates, and real variables (industrial sales index and retail sales
index). The statistical techniques used include univariate
analysis, correlation analysis, and unstructured VAR with
impulse response and variance decomposition analysis. The
authors find that the discretionary central bank regime (pre-
1997) is associated with a strong negative relationship
between monetary and real variables, which turns positive
(albeit remaining small) under a currency board (post-1997).
Under both regimes in Bulgaria money supply was not under
the discretion of the central bank, but for different reasons
(political influences under the discretionary central bank
regime, and the lack of instruments for active monetary pol-
icy under a currency board).
Izak (1998) uses a VAR framework and examines the
transmission through the lending channel between 1993 and
1997 in the Czech Republic. He shows that the very first
step of the transmission from CNB repo rate to the money
market was efficient and had a relatively small time lag. The
next step between money market rates and bank rates on
newly granted credits was also efficient, the two rates are
cointegrated, and the error correction mechanism is some-
what slower than between central bank repo rate and inter-
bank rates. The relationship between interest rates on
newly granted credit and the volume of credits and invest-
ments had the expected negative sign, but these relation-
ships proved to be statistically insignificant. Investment
Granger causes credit volume with a time lag of 3 and 4
quarters, but not vice versa. Izak (1998) also estimated the
second step of transmission by testing whether credit vol-
ume had an effect on industrial production and found that
the two series are not cointegrated.
Pikkani (2001) uses a multi-equation structural model of
the Estonian economy to study monetary transmission. In
the case of Estonia discretionary policy is prevented by the
currency board, so monetary shocks are represented by
movements in the ECB official rate. Pikkani focuses on the
interest rate and credit channels and on both steps of trans-
mission. He finds that the shocks in the ECB rate do affect
bank rates and lending, but the effects are weak in the long
run. The evidence for the second step is similar – the ECB
rate shock is transmitted to private consumption and invest-
ment, to output and its growth and to inflation and current
account balance, but these links are also weak.
The various studies of monetary transmission in Hungary
(Arvai (1998), Vilagi and Vincze (1998), Arvai and Menczel
(2000)) seem to concentrate on the interest rate channel in
its first and second steps. The general findings for Hungary
are that the first step between market and bank rates does
exist, but there is no strong evidence for the second step
from bank rates to aggregate demand (savings and invest-
ment) or supply. One of the findings of Arvai (1998), how-
ever, is that while there is no relationship between market
and bank rates before 1995, there is a link between market
rates and short-run bank rates after that.
Babich (2001) and Vetlov (2001) use a narrative approach
to study transmission in Latvia and Lithuania respectively,
focusing on interest rate, credit and exchange rate channels
and on both steps of transmission. They find that there exists
a link between market rates and bank rates, especially to
short-run rates. The credit channel is also identified, but it is
relatively weak. With respect to the second step of trans-
mission, the effect of bank rates and of total credit on final
variables such as inflation or industrial production is found to
be very weak or non-existent, while exchange rate is found
to have some impact on inflation and GDP in the case of
Lithuania (the link is difficult to interpret in the case of
Latvia). Authors claim that the credibility of Lithuania's CBA
has affected its effectiveness in bringing down inflation. Inas-
much as credibility can be considered a policy variable, it may
also be important for monetary transmission.
Pelinescu and Scutaru (2000a and 2000b) study in a VAR-
VEC framework the interest rate and credit channels and
both steps of transmission. They find that until 1997 central
bank rates affected bank rates, but later this effect was weak-
ened due to liquidity constraints of commercial banks which
points to the importance of the banking sector structure and
condition  in studying the transmission processes. On the
second step, the interest rates seem to affect private spend-
ing, but do not affect the cost of capital and from there out-
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put (due to the presence of weak budget constraints). Nei-
thercredit nor money influence inflation and industrial pro-
duction significantly, especially in the long run. A very inter-
esting addition to this work is research done by Popa (1996)
who finds in a cointegration framework an asymmetry of
monetary transmission in Romania. Namely, interest rates do
affect private firms' credit, but not state-owned ones. The
relationship between interest rates and state-owned firms'
demand for credits is even found to be positive, while the
opposite is found for private firms. The same holds for the
credit elasticity of output. The observation that monetary
transmission may be asymmetric for private and state-
owned firms may be relevant for all transition countries.
For Slovakia, Dovciak (1999) studies the interest rate and
the exchange rate channels for both steps of transmission.
He finds the evidence for the transmission from short-run to
long-run rates to be conflicting, and attributes it to the lack
of competition between banks and the absence of other
credit sources besides banks – no capital market or non-bank
financial institutions, low level of competition between
banks, high fiscal deficits and crowding out effects. Dovciak
also claims that high interest rates in Slovakia have not affect-
ed savings at the expense of consumption, and cannot con-
firm the existence of an exchange rate channel in either step
of transmission. He explicitly suggests that recent progress in
the reform process will probably strengthen and clarify the
transmission mechanism in Slovakia.
Some general conclusions and suggestions 
The review of the papers dealing with the monetary
transmission mechanism in Central and Eastern Europe
since the beginning of transmission suggests several conclu-
sions. The first, and possibly most important, the papers
reviewed do not hold much evidence of clear monetary
transmission channels in the CEE. Most of the studies deal-
ing with the first step of transmission, especially with the
interest rate channel, do find some link between market
interest rates (usually set or influenced by the central banks)
and commercial banks' deposit and lending rates. However,
even in the case of the first step of transmission, the link
between changes in the central bank instruments or in the
monetary environment variables (for the countries where
no discretionary policy is present) and other intermediary
variables such as the exchange rate, some credit or mone-
tary aggregate, is rarely established.
Given the existing, but usually weak first step of transmis-
sion, the studies generally do not find the existence of a sig-
nificant second step of transmission between the intermedi-
ate variables and the ultimate goals of monetary policy such as
GDP and its growth, savings, investment, consumer spending,
inflation, industrial production, while other ultimate goals like
unemployment and wages are never considered.
Most of the authors explain the weak first step and the
non-existent second step of transmission with institutional
considerations. First, the banking sectors in the different
countries are described as generally underdeveloped, finan-
cial intermediation is considered to be weak, the level of
competition between banks – low, and the legal basis of
financial activity, including the monetary policy setups –
problematic and constantly changing.
Also most of the commentaries  suggest that the authors
believe that monetary policy transmission will improve with
time. The argument is that with the process of integration
with EU implying growing financial intermediation and insti-
tutional and structural reforms, the initial monetary policy
signals will be much clearer, the reaction of the public –
more settled and predictable, and the ultimate effect –
stronger and observable.
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Since the beginning of political and economic reforms in
the ex-Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, the countries in tran-
sition have gone through a multitude of monetary regimes.
By the end of 2000 the full spectrum of monetary policy
setups, including different nominal anchors and balances
between rules and discretion have been introduced across
the region. This was done in the specific transition environ-
ment, along with building of market economy institutions,
the creation of two-tier banking systems, gradual adoption
of prudential standards and turbulent political processes.
The context in which the story of monetary policy dur-
ing transition is submerged is very different from the context
of the same story in developed market economies as well as
in other emerging markets. The reason for this is the transi-
tion process and its characteristics. The level of dependence
of the decisions of monetary authorities (whose establish-
ment was itself one of the transition processes) on the deci-
sions of other, sometimes seemingly quite distant players,
cannot be ignored. Many institutions, organizations, proce-
dures which are assumed to be given in other environments
are not necessarily present in transition.
This fact justifies the need for a narrative about the con-
duct of monetary policy in transition countries, which may
provide valuable insights into the usefulness and the limita-
tions of the formal analysis of monetary transmission in this
context. The present chapter provides such a narrative,
summarizing a review of monetary policy regimes and
events in the countries covered in the report, with a special
attention to the pertinence of the story to the mechanism
of monetary transmission.
Goals, targets and tools
At the initial transition stage all countries studied here
have defined the domestic and external stability of their cur-
rencies as the main goals of monetary policy. In practice,
domestic stability of a national currency relates to the levels
and volatility of inflation, while the external stability has to
do with the adopted exchange rate regime.
The stability of the value of domestic money is a mone-
tary policy goal which is usually explicitly spelled out in the
respective central bank laws. Whether it is termed "nation-
al currency stability" (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Romania,
Slovenia), or "price stability" (Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Slovakia), this ultimate goal of monetary policy
is made a responsibility of the monetary authority in every
transition country reviewed here.
In some cases, the respective laws envisage one addi-
tional, and equal in importance, goal for the monetary
authority – securing the working of the payment system, or
ensuring liquidity, as is the case for the Bulgarian and the
Slovenian national banks. In other cases (Czech Republic,
Lithuania, Poland), legislators allow explicitly for a strictly
secondary objective for the central banks, which is loosely
defined as providing support for the overall economic poli-
cies of the government1. In all cases, this second objective is
explicitly and strictly subordinated to the goal of price sta-
bility.Thus, given the fact that the maintenance of the pay-
ment system is more of a technical rather than policy issue,
it may be concluded that the main goal for the central banks
in all transition countries studied here and throughout the
transition period, has been price stability.
While goals have been identical, the outcomes with
respect to inflation have been widely divergent. Taking the
8 years from 1993 to 2000, some of the transition countries
have managed to maintain an average annual rate of infla-
tion2 less than 10% (Czech Republic, Slovakia), while others
have recorded average annual inflation rates of more than
70% (Romania, Bulgaria). If the 1993 GDP level is set at
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1 In the case of the Czech republic the relevant text even contains the requirement that the government policies to be supported are the ones lead-
ing to sustainable economic growth.
2 Calculated as the geometric mean of the annual percentage increases in the CPI.
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100, by the end of 2000 four countries (Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia) have GDP indices of above 125, four
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Romania)
have indices between 100 and 125, and two countries (Bul-
garia and Lithuania) have indices below 100, again indicating
a widely divergent performance.
If inflation and growth may be considered the dominant
ultimate goals of monetary policy in the transition countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, they were pursued with
help of a variety of means. The general tendency in the use
of monetary policy instruments was convergence towards
the market-based instruments that are widely used in glob-
al practice. Initially, at least some of the CEECs used admin-
istrative instruments, such as credit ceilings and refinancing
rationing – Bulgaria until 1993, Poland until 1992, Czecho-
slovakia until 1992 (where also interest rate ceilings were
used). Later, all countries except for the ones with currency
boards, adopted the three traditional tools of open market
operations, discount rates, and reserve requirements.
These were often accompanied by other instruments aimed
at subtracting excess liquidity from the financial system (Pol-
ish National Bank bills, National Bank of Slovakia bills, Bank
of Slovenia bills, Bank of Estonia certificates of deposit). In
the currency board countries (Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithua-
nia), all central banks retained the ability to use the reserve
requirements, and a limited ability to influence the balances
of commercial banks directly.3
With respect to operating targets, some central banks
have "changed their minds" several times since the beginning
of transition – Poland shifted from money market rate in
1993-1995 to reserve money in 1996-1997 back to money
market rate after 1998, the Czech Republic moved from
monetary base in 1992-1994, to bank reserves in 1994-
1995, to money market rates in 1996-1997, to the more
strictly defined 1 week PRIBOR since 1998. Other countries
have stayed with one operating target throughout – a
money market rate in Hungary, reserve money or the mon-
etary base in Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria (before its cur-
rency board). It is possible that the countries which relied
on the same operating targets throughout the period may
exhibit a better link between instrument variables and oper-
ating target variables in formal analysis.
In terms of intermediate targets, some countries have
also had been persistent, while others have changed the tar-
gets. Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been con-
cerned with their exchange rates as the dominant nominal
anchor throughout the period of transition.4 Slovenia has
also been persistent in its intermediate target throughout
the period (M3 money supply target). In Bulgaria the
exchange rate has always been a major target for the central
bank. Prior to the currency board introduction, the
exchange rate was targeted together with the money supply
and the level of domestic credit. Romania has been con-
cerned mostly with the level of general interest rates after
1996. Slovakia has moved from a predominant exchange
rate target before 1998 to a money growth target after
1998. Possibly the most interesting cases are Poland and the
Czech Republic, which after using exchange rate, broad
money growth and interest rates (Poland) or the exchange
rate (the Czech Republic) as targets, have adopted explicit
inflation targeting, and use the more traditional intermediate
targets mostly as indicators.
This brief description of the intermediate targets, fol-
lowing the enumeration of the various and often changing
operative targets used by the Central and East European
central banks, indicates that statistical, especially causal, links
between the different variables may be expected to be
weak. However, one valid observation is that all CEECs
have found it extremely important to actively manage their
exchange rates to achieve the ultimate goals.
Exchange rate regimes
Over more than ten years of transition and across the
countries in the sample, the full range of exchange rate
regimes have been introduced for shorter or longer periods.
This claim is substantiated in table 1, which illustrates the
historic developments in the exchange rate regimes of the
10 countries in the sample.
The columns of Table 1 contain the variety of exchange
rate regimes ranging from highly institutionalized hard pegs,
such as the Currency Board Arrangements (CBA), through
looser fixed exchange rate regimes, different types of crawl-
ing pegs, to completely free floating currency. The crawling
peg regimes are split into three groups according to the
magnitude of the variation of the exchange rate allowed by
the monetary authority before intervention – the wider this
variation, the closer in practice is the respective regime to a
free float.
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4 However, it may be inferred that the Hungarian National Bank was also paying attention to general interest rates, trying to stimulate domestic saving.
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The first observation, which can be made after looking
at table 1, is that there have been quite a few exchange rate
regime changes, some of them quite dramatic, others – sub-
tle. One consequence of the relatively frequent shifts in
exchange rate regimes in most countries is that it makes the
formal analysis of relationships between different variables
more complicated and the inferences less precise.
The second inference that emerges from the table, is
that with time countries tend to move towards the
extremes, i.e. after shorter or longer periods of searching,
by now most of the countries have either hard pegs or free
floating regimes. This is very much in line with the global
observation of this tendency made by Fischer (2000). Like
many other countries, it seems that transition economies,
too, learn in the course of time that the polar regimes (hard
peg and free float) better suit the conduct of monetary pol-
icy. Consequently, they prove more sustainable and stable,
and in the end they turn out better than the more discre-
tionary "mixed" regimes that seemingly allow for better
control, but are practically vulnerable and unstable.
Another important observation about the exchange rate
regimes in the transition countries in the sample is that with
the exception of Estonia5 and Slovenia6 all countries have
made significant moves (in most cases more than one) with-
in the space of exchange rate regimes7. In this respect there
are two clearly differentiated groups, which generally move
in opposite directions. The group of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary start the processes of eco-
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5 Estonia chose a currency board arrangement at the very beginning of introduction of its national currency and of creation of its financial system,
and has not changed this regime since.
6 Slovenia, after a very brief period of free floating necessitated by high exchange rate volatility and lack of reserves after emerging from ex-
Yugoslavia, chose a managed float and has maintained this regime since then.
7 Romania also has experienced a regime change, but it moved from direct administration of the exchange rate for firms until the end of 1996 (a
regime which is difficult to place in the space of Table 1) to a managed float in the beginning of 1997.
Table 1. Exchange rate regimes in transition countries, 1990-2001
Year CBA Fixed Peg/band
<2.5%
Peg/band
2.5-7.5%
Peg/band
>7.5%
Managed
float
Free
float
1990 Poland, Hungary Czechoslovakia
1991 Hungary Poland,
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
1992 Estonia Hungary Czechoslovakia Lithuania,
Slovenia
Bulgaria,
Latvia
1993 Estonia Hungary Czech Rep.,
Slovakia
Lithuania,
Slovenia
Bulgaria,
Latvia
1994 Estonia,
Lithuania
Latvia, Hungary Czech Rep.,
Slovakia
Bulgaria,
Slovenia
1995 Estonia,
Lithuania
Latvia Czech Rep.,
Slovakia,
Hungary
Bulgaria,
Slovenia
1996 Estonia,
Lithuania
Latvia Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland, Slovakia Bulgaria,
Slovenia
1997 Estonia,
Lithuania,
Bulgaria
Latvia Hungary Czech Rep.,
Poland, Slovakia
Romania*,
Slovenia
1998 Estonia,
Lithuania,
Bulgaria
Latvia Hungary Slovakia Poland Romania,
Slovenia
Czech
Rep.
1999 Estonia,
Lithuania,
Bulgaria
Latvia Hungary Poland Romania,
Slovakia,
Slovenia
Czech
Rep.
2000 Estonia,
Lithuania,
Bulgaria
Latvia Hungary Romania,
Slovakia,
Slovenia
Czech
Rep.,
Poland
2001 Estonia,
Lithuania,
Bulgaria
Latvia Hungary Romania,
Slovakia,
Slovenia
Czech
Rep.,
Poland
* Until the end of 1996 there was a heavy administering of the exchange rate in Romania, with 3 different exchange rates. As of the beginning
of 1997 the regime is a managed float.
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nomic reforms with more or less hard pegs and by 2001
have moved to free or near-free floating. The opposite
movement is observed for Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia.
Beginning reforms with regimes close to free floating, these
countries have found it necessary to introduce8 hard and
formalized pegs. This "stylized fact" is, of course, subject to
change with time, but the change cannot be expected to be
too dramatic. All of the countries discussed here are apply-
ing for membership in the European Union, and will have
the obligation to converge to the ERM II regime in the fore-
seeable future, so the further dynamic of the respective
exchange rate regimes is highly predictable.9
It is difficult, however, to generalize the reasons for the
changes in exchange rate regimes in the transition countries
– each country has a unique set of circumstances and policy
decisions. One speculative explanation of the stylized fact
can be that countries where the dynamics of the nominal
exchange rate10 has become a political problem, have opted
for hard peg regimes, while countries where the nominal
exchange rate has been less erratic and has constituted less
of a political issue, have gradually moved towards a regime
of free floating.
Exchange rate regimes are important for the transmis-
sion of monetary changes in transition countries in several
ways. Arguably the most important way is through the rele-
vance of the exchange rate regime, of its credibility for the
economic agents, and of the actual behavior of the nominal
exchange rate for the level of currency substitution. The
higher the level of currency substitution in a country, the less
effective the traditional set of monetary policy tools at the
disposal of the respective central bank. Actions of the mon-
etary authority pertaining to money market interest rates,
reserve requirements, and refinancing may turn out to have
a negligible effect on, say, inflation and output in comparison
with actions of the monetary authority aiming at influencing
the behavior of agents with respect to the currency struc-
ture of their assets.
Another way in which the exchange rate regime, its
credibility and effectiveness are relevant for the output and
price processes in transition economies is through its rele-
vance, together with the level of structural reforms, with
the degree of fiscal discipline, and with the quality of the
overall investment climate, for the inflow of foreign invest-
ments. This theme will be taken up in the next section.
The importance of the transition context
The monetary policy transmission mechanism is strong-
ly influenced by many factors beyond the monetary policy
tools. Such influence is, of course, typical for the context of
monetary policy everywhere, but it may be very specific
during transition. The politics of transition, the extent and
quality of structural reforms, including the role of the cen-
tral bank, the different developments in the financial sector
are important elements of the monetary policy context in
transition.
As mentioned previously, politics may be an important
element of the monetary landscape during transition. Transi-
tion involves a fundamental transformation not only of the
economic system, but of the political system as well. Since
every transition country has gone through the initial transition
recession characterized by a severe loss of living standards,
decisions about economic policy have been highly dependent
on the resolution of political and social issues. At the same
time, institutions and organizations necessary for the conduct
of monetary policy were only being established at the begin-
ning of transition. At least initially they did not have the insti-
tutional and political capacity to oppose and defeat decisions
of other actors in the field of economic policy.
A brief look at monetary policy developments in the
countries studied here offers support for this point. The fis-
cal stance of the respective governments, which reflects
the outcome of a complex political process, has been
important for the monetary environment. This is by defini-
tion true for the currency board countries, where mone-
tary policy boils down to a simple and strict rule with neg-
ligible possibilities for discretion and as a result the sustain-
ability of the whole regime depends on the behavior of the
fiscal policy.
A good example is provided by the policy actions aimed
at cushioning the effects of the Russian crisis of 1998 under-
taken in the three Baltic countries, all of which have a
regime of currency board or hard peg. The reaction to the
crisis was most substantive in the budgetary sphere. The
increases in the budget deficits were the major response to
the difficulties presented by the crisis to these countries, and
the rest of the burden was borne by the real economy. Con-
sequently, all three Baltic countries suffered GDP contrac-
tion, interest rates increases, stagnation in prices and money
supply in the three quarters following the crisis.
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9 Of course, the issue whether the currency board arrangements will be recognized as satisfying the ERM II requirements still remains unclear.
10 Usually closely related to the dynamics of the domestic price level.
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In countries where monetary policy has enjoyed more
formal independence, such as Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria (before 1997), the fiscal devel-
opments have become main factors influencing the financial
markets and major determinant of the overall investment
climate and confidence in the economy. This relevance has
taken a variety of forms. In Romania and Bulgaria one of the
major channels were large arrears of state owned enter-
prises to the banking sector which influenced their behavior
and also led to eventual monetization of quasi-fiscal deficits.
In the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s the
adopted privatization method through vouchers led to
accumulation of bad loans, while at the same time fiscally
determined wage increases and government investment
projects led to an expansion of demand while supply was
unrestructured and insufficient, thus leading to increases in
inflationary pressure. For Slovakia, persistently high budget
deficits are considered one of the factors weakening the link
between monetary impulses and medium term interest
rates, and are commonly made responsible for the 1997
currency attack (Dovciak, 1999). In Poland, the beginning of
the 1990s saw the issuance of treasury bills by the govern-
ment as the most potent instrument for absorbing excess
liquidity. One of the reasons for the relatively slow drop of
inflation and the corresponding lower level of confidence in
the currency board regime in Lithuania were the adminis-
tratively set increases in regulated prices.
In an environment of underdeveloped financial interme-
diation (see below) and overall crisis of the real sector,
which corresponds to the initial period of transition, the
state finds itself as the only credible issuer of securities.
Given its social needs at that moment, it usually utilizes this
position heavily, with two adverse effects. First, large
resources are crowded out from the fledgling private sec-
tor. Second, the development of financial intermediation is
impeded. As a result, the behavior of the fiscal policy in the
countries mentioned above, was the major determinant of
price dynamics (when the deficits were monetized in one
fashion or another), of interest rates, and of financial flows
for long and important periods. In at least one extreme case
(Bulgaria) the ease of borrowing, among other things,
helped to create a disincentive for the government to
undertake painful structural measures, encouraged it to
accumulate large deficits, and severely hindered the devel-
opment of the private sector.
The degree of commitment of the transition govern-
ments to implementing structural reforms and the resulting
quality and speed of these reforms is an important determi-
nant of the environment of monetary policy and thus of the
link between policy actions and macroeconomic variables.
From the point of view of monetary policy and its transmis-
sion, structural reforms define many of the constraints faced
by firms and households, and thus to a large extent shape
their behavior in different circumstances, including their
response to monetary policy actions.
For example, structural reforms to a large extent con-
sist, among other things, of fundamental transformations in
property rights, and especially in property rights enforce-
ment mechanisms. This includes changes in formal and
informal institutions and hence in incentives faced by eco-
nomic agents. The way in which property rights are defined
and enforced in a transition country to a large extent deter-
mines the relative sizes of groups of agents that engage in
productive or redistributive entrepreneurship, as well as
the actual relative rate of return to illegal or "gray" activities.
Another important link between the quality of definition
and enforcement of property rights and real economic
activity is through the time horizon of decisions made by
economic agents. Poor property rights definition and
enforcement result in shorter time horizons due to
increased uncertainty about outcomes and severely damp-
ens the ability of the financial system to perform its basic
functions. Therefore, the decisions of economic agents as to
the type of economic activity to engage in and appropriate
time horizons to choose, determine on the macro level
investment behavior, overall GDP potential and dynamics,
the money multiplier, the effectiveness and efficiency of
financial intermediaries.
An important element of structural reforms affecting the
monetary policy directly is the degree of formal and infor-
mal independence of the newly created central banks and
the definition of their responsibilities. The institutional
strength of a central bank is important for monetary trans-
mission, because the weaker the monetary authority, the
less able it is to implement independent policy decisions.
Provided that central banks in transition were just being
created from scratch as independent policymakers and
were correspondingly inexperienced and incoherent, the
opportunities for other actors to influence their decisions
were ample, and the problem was especially pronounced.
These 'other' actors were predominantly politicians and
commercial bankers. Through their relative institutional
strength they were able to impose on central banks, with
various degree of success, monetization of budget deficits
and refinancing of dubious credit expositions. In the begin-
ning of transition the central banks were more or less inad-
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equate in their regulatory functions and were not capable of
strictly imposing prudential regulation standards on com-
mercial banks, which also made them intervene periodically
by injecting liquidity to avert crises.
The decisions of central banks influenced by other insti-
tutional actors were often in conflict with other decisions,
related to the use of more traditional monetary instru-
ments and aimed at the usual goals of price stability,
employment, and real growth. This led to inconsistent
behavior of the monetary authorities in transition countries
on many occasions, only some examples of which are pre-
sented below.
The fixed exchange rate regime announced by the Hun-
garian National Bank between 1990 and 1995 was in conflict
with other goals and actions of both the fiscal and the mon-
etary authorities, and as a result the currency was devalued
no less than 23 times in these 5 years. Whatever interests or
goals were pursued through these actions, they did not
serve the credibility of the fixed exchange rate regime. In
1992 the Bank of Latvia was trying to curb inflation through
relatively high interest rates, but was also giving out direct
loans to the government, providing an inflationary impulse.
After having allowed for the accumulation of direct govern-
ment debt to the central bank in 1993-1994, the Bank of
Latvia found itself dependent on this position. When it was
trying to foster economic growth by dropping interest rates,
it could not stop the government from returning the old
debt, which was in practice a sterilization of the expansion-
ary policy. In 1995-1996 the National Bank of Slovakia was
trying to limit money growth by a mix of increased reserve
requirements and refinancing tightening, but at the same
time was sterilizing foreign capital inflows deemed to be too
large, and was thus increasing the growth of M2. In Decem-
ber 1996, after having raised the base interest rate to record
high levels in an attempt to curb inflation and currency
depreciation, the Bulgarian National Bank agreed to issue
financial aid (of more than 6% of the Bulgarian GDP) to
cover the budget deficits, which set the stage for hyperinfla-
tion and steep depreciation. The monetization of fiscal and
quasi-fiscal deficits, and the inability to prevent banks from
near-crisis situations, have contradicted the disinflation poli-
cies of the Bank of Romania.
Interestingly, on several occasions the inconsistencies in
the signals sent by the central banks were due to their own
relative success. In Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia during the
early stages of transition as well as Poland in 1997-1998, the
central banks managed to credibly commit themselves to
lowering inflation. But the very credibility of this commit-
ment led to increased external confidence in the respective
economies and to inflows of foreign currencies. These
inflows resulted in significant increases in the money supply
thus contributing to slowing down of the disinflationary
process to which the central banks had committed in the
first place. Central banks in these countries responded dif-
ferently. The Bank of Poland started accepting deposits
from the public (to lower money supply), The Bank of
Latvia used interest rates, the Bank of Lithuania used
reserve requirements, and the Bank of Slovenia used
administrative controls over the foreign exchange inflows.
In all cases the need to use these instruments contradicted
other signals the central banks wanted to send, especially
with respect to the goal of increasing output in the wake of
the initial transition recession.
This inconsistent behavior of central banks in transition,
especially in its early stages, naturally means a decreased
effectiveness of the traditional monetary policy tools. In for-
mal studies this may mean a lack of distinct links between
tools, operating targets, intermediate targets, and ultimate
goals of monetary policy. Therefore a study of the level of the
institutional capacity and of the actual independence of cen-
tral banks in transition countries may be quite relevant for the
understanding of their monetary transmission mechanisms.
Despite the importance of the central bank in this mech-
anism, commercial banks are possibly the crucial players, and
their operation is a major determinant of the causal relation-
ships in the monetary environment. The development of
banks during transition has its specific characteristics. First,
most of the transition countries had to establish the tradi-
tional two-tier banking systems in parallel with the initial
stages of other structural reforms. Second, in the initial
stages of transition the banking systems in all transition coun-
tries were dominated by the state through both ownership
of banks and administrative instruments. So banks had to
restructure and learn together with the rest of the economy.
Almost everywhere in the region the number of banks
quickly increased after liberalization of the banking sector.
Most of the new banks were poorly equipped with capital,
inexperienced, and non-competitive. At the same time, they
had to compete for attracting business in the conditions of
excess liquidity inherited from socialist times, coupled with
dramatically falling real economic activity due to the early-
transition recession. Most of the times they had to act in the
environment of soft budget constraints as well. All this
meant aggravated adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lems both between banks and their clients and among
bankers themselves.
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In most transition countries the banking systems were
not capable of overcoming these problems without crises –
outright banking crises in Estonia (1992), Latvia (1995),
Lithuania (1995-1996), Bulgaria (1996-1997), severe bad
loan problems in the Czech Republic (an important factor in
the currency crisis of 1997), Slovakia and Romania. All these
problems can be traced back to lending and borrowing
practices that were unrestrained, expansionary and often
fraudulent. For most of these countries, the banking sys-
tems operated in near-crisis environment for relatively long
periods of time. Under these conditions, both the bankers
and the depositors were facing specific constraints, and
were engaged in solving distinct problems. The resulting
behavior decreased furthermore the effectiveness of what-
ever remained as coherent signals left after the inconsisten-
cies of the central bank actions.
Some general conclusions
The narrative about monetary policy in CEE since the
beginning of transition presented in this chapter is aimed at
showing that for much of the decade of reforms the envi-
ronment in which monetary policy was conducted was far
from approximating "neoclassical" conditions. With respect
to the formal analysis of monetary transmission in these
countries during this period, at least two important obser-
vations need to be emphasized.
The first one is that some specific constraints and behav-
ioral incentives in the transition context may render tradi-
tional policy tools less effective than a neoclassical environ-
ment would suggest. During transition, the institutions
which are important for the effectiveness of monetary poli-
cy are underdeveloped by definition, while processes ham-
pering monetary transmission (budget deficits, bad loans,
various predatory projects) may be very strong or even
dominant at times. This environment may even force the
monetary authority itself into inconsistent actions, decreas-
ing their effectiveness even further.
The second observation is that the transition is a very
dynamic phenomenon, which was subject to constant qual-
itative change in all countries reviewed here since the early
1990s. Structural change was observed throughout the
period and thus the underlying environment of the data was
changing and was not homogeneous for the period. It may
be claimed that towards the end of the observed period the
monetary environment was much closer to Western stan-
dard conditions than in the beginning. Thus all countries
have experienced at least one structural break, with later
periods more favorable for formal analysis than earlier ones.
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Following the narrative part that was meant to shed
some light on the related literature (chapter 2) and the
importance of the transition context (chapter 3) we now
proceed to the empirical part of the paper. In this chapter
we describe the variables used in subsequent analysis with
the special emphasis on the measure of inflation. The fol-
lowing chapter presents empirical analysis. 
4.1. Core Inflation Estimates and Selection
Inflation behavior is central to analysis of transmission
mechanism. Consequently, the choice of inflation indicator is
very important to subsequent research. Most studies on relat-
ed subjects use the conventional measure of inflation, i.e. the
consumer price index (CPI). However, using the CPI as a
proxy for general price movements in transition economies
might prove misleading. Radical relative price shifts that have
taken place throughout the decade of the 1990s have caused
serious distortions in the price structure. It is a well docu-
mented fact11 that prices of some goods and services (such as
pharmaceuticals, fuels, electricity and municipal services) have
undergone a pronounced upward adjustment. The CPI
assigns each price movement the weight proportional solely
to its share in total household expenditures and is therefore,
by construction, very sensitive to the presence of outlier price
jumps. Consequently, extreme price increases, mostly of
administrative nature, were producing substantial upward
bias in the index. In addition to producing a bias, administra-
tive (and agricultural) price changes were also introducing a
great deal of short-term noise to the index. Most transition
countries have also developed a deep-rooted price change
seasonality (both of administrative and weather-based nature)
that often rendered CPI movements erratic. 
For these reasons we felt that CPI-based inflation will
not serve our purpose very well and instead we decided to
make use of core inflation. However, core inflation is not a
clearly defined concept in theory and therefore renders
itself to various practical interpretations. In general all statis-
tical techniques proposed in the literature rely on the notion
that measuring core inflation is in fact a statistical problem of
estimating trend price movements. Therefore methods
used currently across central banks are constructed to best
gauge fundamental price changes in the economy and
abstract from short-run and reversible relative price shifts.
These methods include: permanent exclusion of broad CPI
aggregates such as food or energy (in most countries),
trimmed means (for example in UK and Poland) or variance-
weighted means (Canada).  
Core inflation estimates
We decided to devote a separate section to core infla-
tion for a number of reasons.  First, official core inflation
estimates are not available for all transition economies, so
we had to compute our own series. Secondly, most coun-
tries that calculate core inflation do so, using different tech-
niques and methods. Finally, for a couple of countries we
found "competing estimates" calculated by different institu-
tions (Hungarian central bank and statistical office) or the
same institution (Poland's central bank).
We could not find official core inflation series12 for the
following countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. For some countries that publish core
inflation, initial sample years were missing, so extending the
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11 See for example Pujol and Griffiths, 1996 and WoŸniak, 1998.
12 Neither central banks nor statistical agencies did not publish official estimates on their websites and in most important periodic publications (such
as monthly bulletins).
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series back to 1995 was necessary. Using the methodology
provided by the central banks we calculated the respective
series for Poland for 1995-97 and for Slovakia for 1995-
1996. Czech and Hungarian series were the only series that
covered the entire sample period, i.e. 1995-2000. 
For the countries for which we had no estimates, we
calculated two conventional, most frequently used core
indices:
• Core inflation index with prices of food and energy
excluded,
• Core inflation index with administratively controlled
prices excluded.
Calculation of the second index required some addition-
al research to determine the extent of the controlled sector
in each country. Goods and services most commonly elimi-
nated included electricity, gas, fuels, pharmaceuticals, rents,
central heating and hot water supply.
Thus, our core inflation database contained 2 or 3 core
inflation series for each country. In order to determine
which one should be included in the subsequent calculations
we used a set of criteria recently put forth in the literature. 
Series selection
Our main selection criterion was based on a set of 3
necessary conditions of a good core inflation indicator: unbi-
asedness, "attraction" and exogenity. This criterion was first
proposed by Freeman (1998) and then augmented by a
group of economists from the Central Bank of Portugal13.
These criteria refer to 3 properties that any good core infla-
tion estimate should posses if it is to be helpful for monetary
authorities: 
• Core inflation series should be unbiased with respect to
the CPI.
• CPI should fluctuate around core inflation, i.e. core
inflation should "attract" the CPI. 
• Core inflation should be (strongly) exogenous with
respect to the CPI.
These properties have been formalized in a set of 3 cri-
teria (see for example Marques, P. D. Neves and da Silva,
2000). In the notation below πc refers to core inflation and
π to CPI inflation: 
Criterion 1) Unbiasedness
πc is I(1) and πc and π are cointegrated with unitary coef-
ficient, i.e. (πc - π) is stationary with zero mean
Criterion 2) "Attraction"
There is an error correction mechanism for π given by
(πct-1 - πt-1), i.e. γ≠0 in the equation:
Criterion 3) Exogeneity 
πc should be weakly (strongly) exogenous with respect
to π, i.e. λ (as well as all thetas -θj) should be equal to zero
in the following equation: 
Our evaluation and selection procedure involves check-
ing the above criteria for 2 or 3 available core inflation series
for each country. If out of the 2 or 3 series, only 1 fulfills all
the criteria, this series is chosen to be the superior core
inflation estimate and will be used in subsequent analysis. If
however, either more than one series fulfills the criteria or
none of the series fulfills them, we proceed to the next
selection step. This step makes use of the earlier criterion
formalized by Cecchetti (1996) and applied most extensive-
ly in the core inflation literature. The criterion refers to
minimizing deviations from trend inflation. Cecchetti
points out that what central bankers are looking for in
monthly inflation figures are timely estimates of a long-term
trend in general price level. Therefore, core inflation series
that tracks this trend closely should also be considered a
good inflation measure for monetary policymakers.   
Two assumptions are crucial in order to evaluate core
inflation series using this criterion. First, one needs to define
the trend series and the function to be minimized. In our
calculations we used a 24-month moving average of the CPI
inflation as a proxy for the trend and a root mean square
error (RMSE) as a deviation function:
Root mean squared error RMSE= ( N-1 Σ di2 )0.5
where d is the deviation of core inflation from the 24-
month centered moving average of CPI inflation and N is
the number of observations.14
The selection procedure we adopted can be summa-
rized as follows:
Step 1) Check the unbiasedness, attraction and exogeni-
ty criteria for all series available for each of the 10 countries.
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Table 2. Selected core inflation indicators
Country Selected core inflation series
Poland CPI excl. food and fuels (‘net inflation’)*
Hungary CPI excl. seasonal foods, fuels and pharmaceuticals
(‘central statistical office core inflation’)
Czech Republic CPI – administratively controlled items (‘net inflation’)
Slovenia CPI excl. food and energy
Slovakia CPI excl. administratively controlled items (‘core inflation’)
Romania CPI excl. unprocessed foods and administrative prices
Lithuania CPI excl. food and energy
Latvia CPI excl. food and energy
Estonia CPI excl. administratively controlled items
Bulgaria CPI excl. administratively controlled items
* Names in parentheses refer to official names of core series as given by the institution calculating it in a respective country.
Figure 1. Core inflation index (Jan 1995=100)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
BU L
ROM
100
150
200
250
95-01 95-05 95-09 96-01 96-05 96-09 97-01 97-05 97-09 98-01 98-05 98-09 99-01 99-05 99-09 00-01 00-05 00-09
CZE
EST
HUN
LAT
LIT
POL
SLK
SLO
95-01 95-05 95-09 96-01 96-05 96-09 97-01 97-05 97-09 98-01 98-05 98-09 99-01 99-05 99-09 00-01 00-05 00-09
BUL- Bulgaria, CZE-Czech Republic, EST-Estonia, HUN-Hungary, LAT-Latvia, LIT-Lithuania, POL-Poland, ROM-Romania, SLK-Slovakia, 
SLO-Slovenia.
Source: Respective central bank's websites and authors' calculations.
21
Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy...
If the results point to one particular series, this series will be
used as a core inflation estimate for the respective country.
Step 2) If step 1) yields inconclusive results, select the
series based on minimizing its deviation from the trend (24-
month moving average of the CPI). Choose the series with
the smallest root mean squared error of the deviation. 
In table 2 we present results15 of our selection, i.e.
series that were chosen based on the selection process
described above for each country. All 10 core inflation
series are depicted in figure 1 as indices set at 100 in Janu-
ary 1995.
4.2. Data Presentation 
Most data series used in subsequent analysis come from
the International Monetary Fund's International Financial
Statistics Database16. Alternatively, if the data were not
available in the IFS the following databases and sources
were used: Information Notice System Database, OECD
Main Economic Indicators Database, respective IMF Coun-
try Desk Databases, respective statistical offices and central
bank publications. All data series are in monthly frequency
and cover the period January 1995 – December 2000. Thus
there are 72 monthly observations.
Exchange rate used is the average local currency against
the Euro, interest rates are most important local short-term
money market rates (usually 1- or 3-month interbank rate)
and industrial production has the conventional definition. Core
inflation selection was explained in the preceding section. 
Table 3 presents developments in four variables that we
intend to use in the first stage of monetary transmission
analysis for selected countries. A number of conclusions can
be drawn from this table. There are two countries that
experienced hyperinflation in the period between 1995-
2000: Bulgaria and Romania. As the table makes clear these
episodes proved very detrimental to growth and both coun-
tries made no progress in terms of industrial output. Output
actually fell in Bulgaria (which had a more severe inflation
outburst) and it rose as little as 2% in Romania. Hungary
and Poland  are on the other side of the growth experience.
Hungary more than doubled its industrial output within six
years, while Poland's output grew by almost 60%. Remain-
ing countries managed to boost their output by around 10-
20% within six years. All countries had lower interest rates
in December 2000 than in January 1995, which reflects
lower inflation (more precisely a twelfth difference of ana-
lyzed core inflation index). The biggest decline took place in
Bulgaria and Latvia, thanks to currency board arrangements. 
It turns out that high-growth countries were also the
ones with relatively high inflation. Hungarian and Polish
price levels more than doubled within the sample years.
During this period Hungary has been conducting a more
accommodative monetary policy, its exchange rate depreci-
ated against Euro some 93 index points and interest rates
fell by some 14 percentage points. In the same period Pol-
ish zloty depreciated only 25% against Euro and interest
rates fell 11 percentage points.
The correlation between price level and exchange rate
changes is evident – high inflation countries tend to have
sizeable exchange rate depreciations. This fact is widely rec-
ognized in economic literature and there is considerable
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15 Details of the testing procedure and results are available from the authors.
16 We would like to thank respective country departments at the IMF for helping us assembling the data.
Table 3. Data summary (Jan-1995 – Dec-2000)
Country Core inflation Growth Interest rate Exchange rate
Bulgaria 3366.5 -10.9 -73.3 2264.7
Czech Republic 28.3 16.3 -5.9 3.0
Estonia 58.2 24.0 -12.7 -3.2
Hungary 134.7 109.7 -14 93.0
Latvia 56.2 9.49 -21.7 -15.4
Lithuania 71 49.9 -22 -25
Poland 112.8 58.8 -11.7 25.1
Romania 1423 1.89 -5.30 992.2
Slovakia 40.9 30.6 -2.43 12.5
Slovenia 57.4 10.3 -13 37.4
Note: Table presents the difference between December 2000 and January 1995 - end points of our data sample. Inflation, growth, interest and
exchange rate are expressed as a change in the index; interest rate is in percentage points; exchange rate indicates change in nominal value, higher
values reflect nominal depreciation.
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evidence suggesting that exchange rate channel was very
important in shaping inflation processes in CEE countries
(for instance see Rybinski 2000). All three Baltic countries
saw their currencies appreciating in nominal terms against
the Euro in the analyzed six-year period. This has put strong
pressure on the real economy and has also been reflected in
a sharp increase in external imbalances. 
4.3. Testing for Level of Integration
The natural start of any multi-variable empirical analysis
is testing for the level of cointegration. We used conven-
tional ADF tests which were computed using maximum lag
order of six17. Limited sample size suggests that parsimo-
nious models should be preferred. Therefore, out of the 3
generally used information criteria (AIC, SBC and HQC) the
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) was selected because it
involves bigger punishment for adding regressors to the
model. The critical value for ADF test with intercept at 95%
confidence level is – 2.90. The analogous value for ADF test
with intercept and linear trend is – 3.48.
One has to keep in mind that the power of ADF-type
tests for the order of integration is very low, especially when
structural breaks are present18. As chapter 3 made clear
structural breaks constitute an imminent characteristic of
time series in CEE economies, hence results reported
below should be taken with some caution. Later we resort
to other cointegration-based testing procedures, which
could lead to more robust conclusions, hence we do not
investigate this issue further.
ADF test results for industrial production seem fairly
consistent across the sample. With the exception of Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovakia all indices are I(1) around constant
and I(1) around linear trend. This is also a plausible hypoth-
esis in our later attempt to pin down the long run relation-
ships. If proper policy mixes are pursued in CEE countries,
industrial output should expand to allow for catching up in
the level on incomes per capita. This is a truly long-run
process, expected to take 20 to 50 years.
ADF test results for exchange rates series are somewhat
surprising. Given wide range of pursued exchange rate
regimes (see table 1) one should expect different statistical
properties of the series. Bulgaria has moved to a currency
board arrangement in he middle of the sample period, Esto-
nia and Lithuania adopted currency boards earlier. Poland
has followed crawling band regime with frequent interven-
tions and then widened the band to float the zloty in May
2000. Hungary has conducted crawling band regime (with a
much tighter band) throughout the sample and decided to
float the forint only in June 2001. Nevertheless, despite
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Table 4. Industrial output: ADF test results 
Industrial  outputTested variable
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
version of the test ADF test with intercept ADF test with intercept and  linear trend
Bulgaria -1.73 / 2 -10.6* / 1 1 -2.11 / 2 -10.6* / 1 1
Czech Republic -2.64 / 4 -10.19* / 3 1 -3.14 / 4 -10.12* / 3 1
Estonia -1.44 / 0 -7.55* / 0 1 -1.51 / 0 -7.55* / 0 # 1
Hungary 0.21 / 2 -11.93* / 1 1 -2.57 / 2 -11.97* / 1 1
Latvia -4.08* / 0 -8.21* / 0 0 -3.97* / 0 -8.16* / 0 0
Lithuania -4.72* / 0 -8.36* / 1 0 -4.73* / 0 -8.29* / 1 0
Poland -1.53 / 5 -8.16* / 4 1 -2.21 / 5 -8.22* / 4 1
Romania -1.86 / 0 -8.03* / 1 1 -2.89 / 0 -7.98* / 1 1
Slovakia -0.2 / 2 -9.12* / 1 1 -3.53* / 1 -9.13* / 1 0
Slovenia -0.17 / 0 -7.12* / 0 1 -2.57 / 0 -7.13* / 0 1
# AIC suggests lag two and then I(1) hypothesis is marginally rejected at 5% level and variable is I(2)
95% significance level is denoted by *
Source: Authors' calculations.
17 Variables: industrial output, core inflation and exchange rate are expressed as logs of indices with base period January 1995=100. Interest rates
are expressed as (1 + interest rate / 100).
18 See for example Bai and Perron (1995) and Rybiñski (1997).
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these differences all exchange rate series are I(1). This out-
come may very well be the consequence of problems sug-
gested by Perron (1989) and Rybiñski (1997), i.e. the low
power of ADF test in the presence of structural breaks. This
argument is of special validity for the economies under
investigation – since most of them experienced many
regime shifts and high inflation episodes. 
To complicate the situation even further we note that
ADF testing procedure suggests that most core inflation
indices in the CEE are I(0). With the exception of Bulgaria,
Romania and Slovenia, core inflation (measured as an index)
appears to be a stationary process. A quick look at the
series (see figure 1) proves that these variables are trended,
so we should use ADF test with linear trend. In the second
specification only Estonia and possibly Latvia appear to have
core inflation stationary around linear trend. These results
are much more encouraging, as one should expect that
countries with non-stationary exchange rates with a rela-
tively strong pass-through from exchange rate to inflation
would also have non-stationary inflation series. Here we
may encounter some problems with the long run, as one
should expect that within next few years these countries
will all lower their inflation rates (twelfth difference of the
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Table 5. Exchange rate: ADF test results 
Tested variable Exchange rate
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
version of the test ADF test with intercept ADF test with intercept and  linear trend
Bulgaria -2.06 / 1 -4.78* / 0 1 -1.22 / 1 -5.17* / 0 1
Czech Republic -2.64 / 0 -10.56* / 0 1 -2.82 / 0 -10.49* / 0 1
Estonia -2.03 / 0 -6.87* / 1 1 -1.00 / 0 -7.12* / 1 1
Hungary -2.31 / 0 -7.42* / 0 1 -0.99 / 0 -7.95* / 0 1
Latvia -0.57 / 0 -6.72* / 0 1 -2.08 / 0 -6.67* / 0 1
Lithuania -1.04 / 0 -6.98* / 0 1 -2.39 / 0 -6.92* / 0 1
Poland -1.76 / 1 -5.76* / 0 1 -0.78 / 1 -6.10* / 0 1
Romania -1.02 / 1 -5.59 * / 0 1 -2.54  / 1 -5.63* / 0 1
Slovakia 0.14 / 0 -6.23* / 0 1 -1.77 / 0 -6.37* / 0 1
Slovenia -2.08 / 1 -10.33* / 0 1 -3.48* / 0 # -10.43* / 0 1
# ADF test for Slovenia showed 95% significance based on SBC criterion, however AIC criterion suggested that variable is I(1)
95% significance level is denoted by *
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 6. Core inflation: ADF test results 
Tested variable Core inflation
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
version of the test ADF test with intercept ADF test with intercept and  linear trend
Bulgaria -1.90 / 1 -5.23* / 0 1 -1.12 / 1 -5.53* / 0 1
Czech Republic -3.22* / 1 -5.28* / 0 0 -1.90 / 1 -6.26* / 0 1
Estonia -3.83* / 1 -2.58 / 0 0 -4.15* / 1 -4.42* / 3 0
Hungary -3.59* / 1 -4.12* / 0 0 -1.80 / 0 -5.57* / 0 1
Latvia -6.39* / 6 -4.87* / 0 # 0 -4.60* / 6 ## -6.57* / 0 0 / 1
Poland -4.10* / 0 -6.26* / 0 0 -1.39 / 0 -7.56* / 0 1
Romania -1.08 / 1 -3.88* / 0 1 -1.67 / 1 -3.98* / 0 1
Slovenia -2.40 / 0 -5.86* / 0 1 -2.95 / 0 -6.08* / 0 1
Lithuania -8.49* / 0 -1.73 / 2 0 -2.16 / 0 -6.71* / 0 1
Slovakia -0.87 / 1 -5.60* / 0 1 -5.13* / 4 -5.62* / 0 0
# AIC criterion selects lag order six, for which ADF test rejects I(1) hypothesis and accepts I(2)
## all lags smaller than do not reject I(1) hypothesis, but all criteria select lag six
95% significance level is denoted by *
Source: Authors' calculations.
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index) to levels common in the Euro area. This belief is
based on the fact that all considered countries applied for
the EU membership and once admitted to the Union will
aim to become members of the Euro-zone. Considering this
as a very likely scenario for near future, any estimate of the
long run (based on the data in the sample) will tend to over-
state the prospective pace of inflation.
Interest rate testing results are consistent with intuition.
If exchange rate and inflation are non-stationary, interest
rates should also be non-stationary. Indeed, with exception
of Romania, all countries exhibit non-stationarity in interest
rate series. Here we tend to look at ADF test without linear
trend, because it would be hard to justify the presence of a
linear trend in the long run relationship which would imply
eventually negative interest rates given the negative slope of
the "trend" in the past six years.
In general ADF testing procedure shows that most ana-
lyzed series are I(1), with core inflation series being I(1)
around linear trend.
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Table 7. Interest rate: ADF test results 
Tested variable Interest rate
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
Level/lag First difference
/lag
Order of
integration
version of the test ADF test with intercept ADF test with intercept and  linear trend
Bulgaria -1.42 / 0 -6.47* / 0 1 -3.84* / 5 ## -6.42* / 0 0 / 1
Czech Republic -0.35 / 0 -8.52* / 0 1 -1.82 / 0 -8.55* / 0 1
Estonia -3.07* / 0 # -10.50* / 0 0 / 1 -3.74* / 0 ### -10.42* / 0 0 / 1
Hungary -0.29 / 0 -8.59* / 0 1 -2.55 / 0 -8.51* / 0 1
Latvia -2.58 / 0 -9.43* / 0 1 -2.27 / 0 -9.72* / 0 1
Poland -1.95 / 1 -4.67* / 0 1 -2.14 / 1 #### -4.63* / 0 0 / 1
Romania -4.50* / 1 -5.60* / 0 0 -4.45* / 1 -5.57* / 0 0
Slovenia -2.33 / 0 -8.60* / 0 1 -3.10 / 0 -8.54* / 0 1
Lithuania -2.88 / 0 -9.62* / 0 1 -3.09 / 0 -9.87* / 0 1
Slovakia -1.17 / 1 -6.50* / 1 1 -0.86 / 1 -10.97* / 0 1
# AIC selects lag order one, and then variable is I(1)
## I(1) for all lag orders except five, however five was selected also by AIC and HQC criteria
### for all lags higher than zero variable is I(1). However all criteria select lag 0, AIC marginally prefers lag zero to lag one
#### AIC selects lag six for which ADF rejects I(1) and accepts I(0)
95% significance level is denoted by *
Source: Authors' calculations.
25
Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy...
In this chapter we would like investigate selected issues
related to transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
the comparative context of 10 Central European countries.
Without developing a rigorous structural model, we employ
conventional techniques of Granger causality tests and gen-
eralized impulse responses to get some insight into the rel-
ative strengths of the most important channels and their
performance across the region. Additionally we investigate
issues related to cointegration in the context of a system of
variables central to the analysis of transmission mechanisms.
5.1. Transmission Channels
The concept of transmission mechanism of monetary
policy we employ is similar to that of the Bank of England's
Monetary Policy Committee (Bank of England, 1999). Fig-
ure 2 presents the diagram depicting this exposition. 
The diagram is augmented by several other channels that
we drew over a grey square to distinguish them from the
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5. Empirical Analysis of Transmission Mechanism and Cointegration
Figure 2.The diagram of transmission mechanism of monetary policy based on Bank of England's exposition (Bank of England, 1999)
Source: Based on Bank of England (1999) with authors' additions (grey square).
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original Bank of England's scheme. One purpose of these
additions is to show how the specificity of transition
economies may change/modify the mechanism. This distinc-
tive character has been the common theme of many  studies
reviewed in chapter 2. Here we give two examples both con-
cerning additional factors that influence inflation and both are
present in the CEE economies to a much bigger extent than,
for instance, in the European Union countries. One of them
is the importance of administrative price increases to inflation
outcomes. As noted in section 4.1 on core inflation, these
price changes have undoubtedly led inflationary processes in
post-socialist economies and still constitute a very important
factor contributing to relatively higher inflation pressures.
Another factor is the Balassa-Samuelsson effect stemming
from higher productivity growth in the tradables' compared
with nontradables' sector19. Both factors produce a substan-
tial upward pressure on prices in transition economies. 
In this paper we decided to restrict ourselves to study-
ing two major transmission channels: exchange rate channel
and interest rate channel and their pass-through on inflation
and output. Far from describing the complete transmission
mechanism, these channels are easily identifiable and are
operating in all countries in the panel. Analysing other chan-
nels, such as expectations or credit channel, is likely to pose
considerable problems with finding comparable data and
making cross-country inferences. 
Since our interest rate variable is the rate in the money
market (MARKET RATES in the diagram), we are clearly
skipping the first stage of transmission from OFFICIAL cen-
tral banks RATES (such as refinance, discount or lombard
rates). We are aware of the fact that the transmission from
official to market rates is the factor that stands in between
monetary policy actions and whatever pass-through to
INFLATION and OUTPUT we identify. However, 3 out of
10 countries considered here have given up their monetary
policy autonomy by adopting currency boards and thus have
no means of setting "official" interest rates. Therefore, we
decided to focus on the transmission from market rates to
inflation and output with the implicit assumption that in non-
currency-board countries the transmission process from
central bank rates to market rates is fairly smooth and pre-
dictable.  Thus, we assume that changes in market interest
rates are triggered directly by changes in official interest
rates through a relatively quick and effective pass-through
and are thus a good proxy for official policy actions.  
We begin our analysis by testing some key causality rela-
tionships postulated in theory, i.e. the causal relationship
between both core inflation as well as industrial output and
interest and exchange rates. We then proceed to analysing
cointegration and impulse responses.
5.2. Granger Causality
We carried out conventional Granger causality tests to
check whether interest rates moves and exchange rate
depreciation have an effect on core inflation and industrial
output. Variables (core inflation, industrial output and
exchange rate indices) have been transformed to annual
growth rates to match the interest rate which is expressed
in annual terms. 
Tests involve estimation of the regular Granger-type
equation:
and testing the hypothesis of no Granger causality from x to
y as the Wald-test of joint insignificance of betas. In our case,
in the first set of tests y was the annual rate of growth of
core inflation index and x was the interest rate and the
annual rate of growth of exchange rate (annual depreciation
of domestic currency vis-à-vis the Euro). In the second set
of tests y was the annual growth rate of industrial output and
causing variables were the same. 
Tests were carried out in a 3-year rolling window to
observe a dynamic pattern of postulated relationships. Start-
ing with the sample: 1996:1-1998-12 and rolling it in one-
month steps yielded 25 sub-samples and hence 25 test
results. Results are presented in figure 3. Data points in the
charts are p-values of the Wald F-statistics for tests con-
ducted on a 36-month sample with the initial observation
marked in the X-axis. Charts in figure 4 show analogous val-
ues for tests of the existence of causality running from inter-
est rate and exchange rate to industrial output. We decided
to choose common lag order for both sets of tests and for
all countries to facilitate comparisons. Higher lag orders
were also tested but did not introduce significant change to
our results.
Granger tests clearly confirm previous results (many of
which have been quoted in the review in chapter 2) on the
relative importance of interest and exchange rate channels.
For most countries exchange rate channel is much more sta-
ble than the interest rate channel. Domestic currency depre-
ciation can be considered a Granger-cause for core inflation
in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia and Romania. In Poland
Latvia and Hungary the causality disappears past the period
starting in the first half 1997. In Slovakia the relationship
becomes significant towards the end of the sample and in
Slovenia no causality from depreciation to inflation was
detected. 
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19 For a recent estimate of the Balassa-Samuelsson effect in CEE coutries, please see Egert (2002).
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Figure 3. Interest rate>core inflation and exch. rate > core inflation Granger causality
(P-values from F-test on the null hypotesis of no-Granger causality. X-axis entries mark first observation of a 3-year rolling window).
Exchange rate and industrial output expressed as 12-month growth rates.
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Interest rate channel is much more unstable throughout
the sample. Slovenia is the only country that seems to have
had this channel operating in the entire period. Significant
causality (at 10% confidence level) was detected for Poland
and Czech Republic for most sub-samples and for remaining
7 countries causality became significant only sporadically
(Lithuania, Bulgaria and Estonia) or was insignificant for the
entire sample period (Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia). 
Granger causality turned out significant less frequently in
the industrial output equations. Here, too, depreciation
influenced output more often than did the interest rate
change. In the case of Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary
and the Baltic countries, we can speak of significant causali-
ty in the majority of the samples. Much less so in the case of
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia where significant causality
running from exchange rate to output was rather rare. 
Causality from interest rate to output on most subsam-
ples was detected in Poland and Czech Republic. Causality
in Romanian and Slovakian equations was present roughly in
the first and second half of the sample, respectively. For all
other countries, there is very little evidence of Granger
causality running from interest rates to industrial output.
5.3. Cointegration Analysis
As a next step of our analysis we wanted to investigate
the existence of cointegration in our set of data series for
the analysed countries. For this purpose as well as for sub-
sequent analysis we chose the following set of endogenous
and exogenous variables widely recognized as crucial to
understanding transmission mechanism in the macroecono-
my. They are as follows: 
Models with similar variables have been proposed in the
literature, for example in the study by Garatt, Lee, Pesaran
and Shin (1999) who additionally include real money balances
in the above list. Our omission of money reflects the fact that
money supply plays a far less significant role in monetary
transmission mechanism than in developed economies amid
low monetization. On the other hand, Granger causality tests
from the previous section, stylised facts and literature on
transmission mechanism in CEE suggests that exchange rate
is the primary and quickest channel of monetary transmis-
sion. At the same time limited number of observations
forced us to reduce the number of variables in the system. 
We begin our analysis by checking for cointegration
among the variables in the system. The shortcomings of
residual based tests for cointegration are well known. The
result could crucially depend on the choice of the left hand
side variable. They do not allow for more than one cointe-
grating relationship and are not efficient, i.e. do not make
the best possible use of available data. Another difficulty
with the residual-based tests for cointegration lies in the fact
that one must know with certainty that the underlying
regressors in the model are I(1). Given the uncertainties
about the level of integration of several variables of interest
(see ADF test results), we follow the ARDL approach devel-
oped by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), which largely over-
comes the problem mentioned above. 
This ARDL approach consists of three steps. In order to
check for cointegration between variables x and y the fol-
lowing ECM model is estimated:
Then, the usual F-statistic is computed for the joint sig-
nificance of both δs, i.e. the null hypothesis is: δ1=0 and
δ2=0.
The distribution of this F-test statistic is non-standard,
critical value bounds are tabulated in Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (2001). If the test value is above the upper bound of
the critical values then we conclude that there exists a long-
run relationship between y and x. If the test value is below
the lower bound we conclude that there is no long-run rela-
tionship. If the test value falls between the two, the test is
inconclusive. 
We follow this procedure to check for the cointegration
in our system by estimating the following equation:
+exogenous variables+error
where y refers to domestic industrial output20, pc – core
inflation index, r– exchange rate and i – interest rate. Exoge-
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Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
Industrial output (y) European Union industrial output
Exchange rate against the Euro (x) European Union PPI
Short term interest rate (i) Euro area interest rate (Bundesbank before 1999)
Core inflation index (pc) Constant, trend
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Figure 4. Interest rate>ind. output and exchange rate > ind. output Granger causality.
(P-values from F-test on the null hypotesis of no-Granger causality. X-axis entries mark first observation of a 3-year rolling window). 
Exchange rate and industrial output expressed as 12-month growth rates.
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nous variables are presented in the above table and com-
prise EU industrial output and PPI, Eurozone interest rate in
addition to trend and constant variables. The test statistic is
the F statistic for the joint significance of all δ's, i.e. δ1=0 and
δ2=0 and δ3=0 and δ4=0
Number of lags (p) included in the equation is deter-
mined by estimating unrestricted VAR models for each
country. Again, SBC criterion is used, because given scarcity
of data more parsimonious models are preferred. In some
cases (Romania, Slovenia, Poland, Estonia) tests based on
the AI criterion strongly favored VAR order higher than
SBC. For these countries we allowed for higher lag order.
The chosen lag order and the resultant ARDL F statistic are
presented in table 8.
As shown in table 8, we cannot reject the hypothesis of
no long-run relationship for all countries with the exception
of Slovenia and Estonia. Having determined this, we would
like to learn more about the nature of the long-run relation-
ship between industrial output, inflation, exchange rate and
interest rates given external growth, inflation and interest
rate conditions. We follow ARDL approach to cointegration
proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1999). We set the maximum
lag order to four and use Schwarz Bayesian Criterion to help
us determine the lag structure. We will repeat this exercise
also for Estonia and Slovenia despite rejection of the hypoth-
esis of long-run relationship in those countries. It may be
wrong from methodological point of view but will still be
useful to see the results for comparative purposes.
We are also aware of the fact that we may not be able to
detect the proper long run relationship on the basis of a 6-
year-long sample of monthly data. However, this is a very
common drawback in this type of analysis, further exacer-
bated by the presence of  structural breaks in transition
economies (for example: an introduction of the currency
board in Bulgaria in the mid-point of the sample). Also, we
decided not to introduce country specific dummies in the
analysis. Using dummies would obviously boost explanatory
power of the estimated models, but at the same time it
would make cross-country comparisons impossible. 
Results of the estimations for the model with industrial out-
put on the left-hand side are presented in table 9. P-values
based on asymptotic standard errors are in brackets. Last col-
umn presents estimate of the error correction mechanism in
the error correction representation of the ARDL model. Model
lag structure was determined by means of the SB criterion. 
Long run relationship between exchange rate and growth
turned out positive in 7 cases and negative in 3 cases. Among
countries characterized by the negative relationship there is
Estonia with a currency board and Czech Republic which
experienced recession after forced crown devaluation in May
1997. Countries with currency boards (Bulgaria, Estonia)
exhibit negative long-run relationship between growth and
interest rates although the result is not statistically significant
in the Estonian model. This negative correlation is consistent
with our expectations, as countries with currency board
arrangements do not have their own monetary policy and
the only way to increase interest rates is to increase country
risk premium. This in turn means capital outflow and con-
traction. In other cases (with the exception of Slovakia and
Slovenia) higher output seems to be associated with higher
interest rates. 
A positive relationship between growth and core inflation
was detected for 6 out of 10 countries. Empirical observa-
tions would suggest that in the long run prices should exhibit
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Table 8. ARDL cointegration tests
Country Lag order
(SBC on unrestricted
VAR)
ARDL F-test Hypothesis of no long run
relationship
Bulgaria 1 12.37 Rejected
Czech Republic 1 18.79 Strongly rejected
Estonia 2 3.47 Accepted#
Hungary 1 10.05 Rejected
Latvia 1 4.94 Marginally rejected##
Lithuania 4 or 1 4.39 Marginally rejected##
Poland 2 20.89 Strongly rejected
Romania 3 9.13 Rejected
Slovenia 3 or 1 3.21 Accepted
Slovakia 1 7.72 Rejected
Note: Lower and upper bounds of critical values in ARDL procedure for our sample are (3.21,4.37)
# If all level variables are I(0) then there could still be long-run relationship. However as shown by ADF tests Estonian exchange rate against
Euro is I(1)
## Our regression has exogenous variables and critical values were simulated without such variables. Therefore distribution of critical values
in our case would be shifted towards higher values
Source: Authors' calculations.
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positive correlation with real growth. For example, with
industrial output growing 5% per year on average and prices
at 2% the coefficient on long run relationship would be
around 0.4. Such statistically significant result was obtained
only for Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. For example in
Romania the long run coefficient is negative, which seems to
reflect the country's experience, namely industrial output
slumps during periods of high inflation. Of course, one would
not expect such estimate to describe the true long-run rela-
tionship, but rather transitory phenomena that took place in
a 6-year-long sample. Last column shows that all equations
(except for Bulgarian and Slovakian ones) are strongly error-
correcting, albeit around dubious long-run paths.
As expected, long-run relationships are very different
among countries, some clearly not reflective of the true
long run behavior of analyzed variables. It appears that the
simple model we used does not recognize the long-run very
well. It is also very likely that at this stage, when in most
countries, not a single full business cycle has been observed
yet, the true long-run relationship cannot be detected.
Obviously, more country-specific approach is required. For
example, models for Bulgaria should include a dummy vari-
able for a period of CBA and in other countries frequent
exchange rate regime shifts and monetary policy rules
changes should be taken into account. This surely goes
beyond the scope of this simple comparative analysis. 
In the next step of our cointegration analysis we would
like to find out how many long run relationships one can
detect for each of the analyzed countries in a cointegrating
VAR framework. As shown in the ARDL approach to coin-
tegration (see table 8), in case of Estonia and Slovenia we
could not reject a hypothesis on no long-run relationship,
however we include those two countries into the computa-
tions for illustrative purposes.
Table 10 presents the results of the cointegration rank
tests based on Johansen's log-likelihood trace and maximum
eigenvalue statistics. Both tests are run in two versions, with
and without trends. They yield very similar results.
Before commenting the results we note that on the
basis of economic theory one should expect two long-run
relationships: one based on the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) and the other one reflecting the Uncovered Interest
Parity (UIP)21. Because our model includes both foreign and
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Table 9. Estimated long run coefficients using ARDL approach (dependent variable – log of industrial output)
Country/
Variable
Model Exchange rate
(log)
Interest rate Core price index
(log)
ECM(-1)
Bulgaria ARDL(0,3,0,2) 1.675 [0.000] -0.113 [0.015] -1.662 [0.000] -1.000 [NONE]
Czech Rep. ARDL(4,0,0,3) -0.226 [0.051] 0.317 [0.134] 0.612 [0.000] -1.888 [0.000]
Estonia ARDL(1,0,0,0) -3.713 [0.003] -0.084 [0.859] -0.322 [0.367] -0.227 [0.018]
Hungary ARDL(3,0,0,4) -0.631 [0.736] 1.944 [0.580] 0.363 [0.806] -0.315 [0.069]
Latvia ARDL(1,0,0,0) 1.537 [0.035] 0.448 [0.625] 0.688 [0.357] -0.352 [0.000]
Lithuania ARDL(1,0,0,0) 1.561 [0.013] 0.869 [0.245] 1.195 [0.043] -0.550 [0.000]
Poland ARDL(2,0,0,0) 0.343 [0.001] 0.426 [0.000] 0.357 [0.000] -0.889 [0.000]
Romania ARDL(1,0,0,0) 0.133 [0.388] 0.040 [0.504] -0.327 [0.006] -0.519 [0.000]
Slovakia ARDL(0,0,0,0) 0.100 [0.297] -0.227 [0.140] 0.503 [0.000] -1.000 [NONE]
Slovenia ARDL(1,0,1,0) 1.602 [0.214] -0.413 [0.327] -1.090 [0.328] -0.144 [0.101]
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 10. Results of Cointegration Rank Tests (Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace) 
Number of long-run relationships according to Johansen's log-likelihood-based trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics.
Form of the
model tested
Restricted intercepts and no trends Unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends
Country
Test statistic Maximum Eigenvalue Trace Maximum Eigenvalue Trace
Bulgaria 3 3 2 2
Czech Rep. 2 2 2 2
Estonia 1 2 3 3
Hungary 3 3 2 2
Latvia 1 1 1 1
Lithuania 1 1 1 1
Poland 3 3 3 3
Romania 2 2 2 2
Slovakia 2 2 2 2
Slovenia 4 4 1 3
Source: Authors' calculations.
21 For example of such model estimated for UK see Johansen and Juselius (1992) and Pesaran, Shin, Smith (2000).
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domestic growth rates (of industrial output) we could also
argue that in the long run these rates should converge.
Indeed it is hard to imagine that in the long-run (say 50
years) average growth rate of one EU member would sub-
stantially differ from a growth rate of another member. This
creates room for the third possible long-run relationship,
but it is unlikely that such a long-run restriction would be
accepted in light of the past data. Also in the coming years
we expect a catching up effect before the long-run equilib-
rium will be established.
As table 10 suggests, indeed for most analyzed countries
we found 2 or 3 long-run relationships. Latvia constitutes an
exception with 1 relationship, while Slovenia and Estonia
show different results depending on the model or statistics
used. Please note that in the ARDL F-test conducted earlier
in these three cases we found either no long-run relation-
ship, or it was only marginally rejected. 
Above results confirm that for a reduced sample of
countries there is a possibility to estimate a cointegrating
VAR and impose restrictions suggested by economic theory
but this task goes beyond the scope of this paper.
5.4. Generalized Impulse Responses
To conclude our study we conduct impulse response
analyses for the group of countries under investigation. Most
common approach is the use of orthogonalized impulse
responses often referred to as Sims approach. However, its
major drawback are severe restrictions on variables
imposed through assuming particular ordering. In order to
circumvent this problem, the concept of generalized
impulse responses (GIR) has been proposed by Koop,
Pesaran and Potter (1996) and applied to VAR models by
Pesaran and Shin (1998). GIR are computed by subjecting a
selected equation to a one-standard-deviation forecast
error shock, and simultaneously all other equations propor-
tionally to correlation of residuals in a selected equation and
other equations. This approach implies that if some variable
moves simultaneously with our instrument variable, we do
not force this correlation to zero (as sometimes happen in
Sims approach), but explicitly allow for simultaneous shock
in this variable equal to the correlation coefficient. There-
fore in GIR approach ordering does not matter. We basical-
ly take a look at the interactions of the data without making
any use of economic theory and without imposing any
restrictions. Below we present and briefly analyze the two
most interesting transmission channels: exchange rate and
interest rate.
Charts in figure 5 present generalized impulse responses
of industrial output, exchange rate and core inflation to a one-
standard-error interest rate shock for all analyzed countries.
Charts in figure 6 present analogous responses to a one-stan-
dard-deviation exchange rate shock. Because of hyperinfla-
tion periods in Bulgaria and Romania during the sample peri-
od, impulse responses for those countries are much bigger in
magnitude and therefore are depicted in a separate chart. 
Positive short-term-interest-rate shock brings about
very different reactions of industrial output in different
countries. It dampens output in the short run in Slovakia
(SLK), Hungary (HUN) and Slovenia (SLO) while it raises it
in Lithuania (LIT), Estonia (EST), Czech Republic (CZE) and
Poland (POL). Latvia (LAT), Bulgaria (BUL) and Romania
(ROM) have a mixed pattern. The impact seems to die out
after 12 months for most countries. 
The response of exchange rate to the interest rate shock
was only calculated for those countries that have a currency
regime allowing for exchange rate variation. Among these
countries, in Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland the interest rate
shock brings about initial depreciation followed by appreci-
ation of the currency. Romania experiences persistent
appreciation and Czech Republic – depreciation. Hungary
exhibits a switching pattern with longer-run appreciation.
Core inflation response to interest rate shocks varies
across countries. In some of them, e.g. Lithuania, Hungary
and Slovenia, the response is consistent with the theory, i.e.
higher interest rates dampen inflation. In Bulgaria after initial
boost, inflation subsides. In Slovakia and Czech Republic
interest rate shock raises inflation persistently which leads
to higher inflation even after 3 years following the shock. In
Romania, apparently, there is an instability problem – core
inflation is still on the rise after 3 years. 
Positive exchange rate shocks (equivalent to one-time
depreciation) seem to boost industrial output in most countries
in the short run. This influence generally disappears after 12-18
months (Latvia is the exception).  In Romania, Bulgaria and
Estonia domestic currency depreciation vis-a-vis the Euro low-
ers output and it takes up to 3 years for this effect to disappear. 
Responses of the short term interest rates to the depreci-
ation shock have similar patterns across most countries: in the
first 2-5 months following the shock, interest rate rises and
then  starts to fall. In some countries (Romania, Estonia, Slove-
nia) disturbances to interest rate oscillate further before stabi-
lizing at 0 after 24 months. For most countries, the disturbance
disappears after 2 years. Only in the case of Latvia (again), the
shock has persistent effects and keeps the interest rate below
the initial level for longer than 36 months. This points to pos-
sible instability of the Latvian system estimated here.
Depreciation shock fuels core inflation in most coun-
tries. The effect is sizeable in Slovakia, Latvia, Czech Repub-
lic and Poland and seems to persist even after 36 months.
The impact is also big in Bulgaria and Romania (both had
hyperinflation episodes in the sample), but starts to decline
after approximately half a year to fall slightly below 0 after 2
years. Core inflation does not seem to be significantly influ-
enced by deprecation in Hungary, Slovenia and Lithuania.
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Figure 5. Generalized impulse responses to one-standard-error shock in the interest rate equation
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Figure 6. Generalized impulse responses to one-standard-error shock in the exchange rate equation
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As more central banks across Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) move towards inflation control – either in the
form of direct inflation targeting or indirectly through infor-
mal targets – good knowledge of transmission mechanism in
the economy becomes crucial for implementing good poli-
cies. So far the volume of studies in the region devoted to
this issue is not overly impressive. Specifically, there have
been no attempts made to study the issue in a comparative
context of several economies. We wanted to fill this gap by
investigating transmission mechanism using the same
methodology for 10 CEE countries: Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia.
We started our paper by reviewing literature related to
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in CEE coun-
tries. In the case the region concerned, this research field,
like many others, is naturally constrained by at least two
important factors. The first is the lack of data in terms of
both length of time series and of quality and reliability. The
second is constant institutional changes in the studied coun-
tries which renders the different models and techniques
structurally unstable and the results – generally volatile. The
review we provide is probably one of the most compre-
hensive and up-to-date review of transmission mechanism
for the region of CEE.
In the following chapter of our paper we presented a
discussion on various issues related to transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy. The narrative description was
meant to shed some light on how the process of transition
might impact the various transmission channels, i.e. in what
way are CEE countries different as far as the analysis of
transmission is concerned. The main conclusion of the
chapter was that during transition the environment in which
monetary policy was conducted was far from "neoclassical"
conditions. With respect to the formal analysis of monetary
transmission in these countries during this period, at least
two important observations need to be emphasized.
The first one is that some specific constraints and behav-
ioral incentives in the transition context may render tradi-
tional policy tools less effective than a neoclassical environ-
ment would suggest. During transition, the institutions
which are important for the effectiveness of monetary poli-
cy are underdeveloped by definition, while processes ham-
pering monetary transmission (budget deficits, bad loans,
various predatory projects) may be very strong or even
dominant at times. This environment may even force the
monetary authority itself into inconsistent actions, decreas-
ing their effectiveness even further.
The second observation is that transition is a very
dynamic phenomenon, which was subject to constant qual-
itative change in all reviewed countries since the early
1990s. Structural change was observed throughout the
period and thus the underlying environment of the data was
changing and was not homogeneous for the period. It may
be claimed that towards the end of the observed period the
monetary environment was much closer to Western stan-
dard conditions than in the beginning. Thus all countries
have experienced at least one structural break, with later
periods more favorable for formal analysis than earlier ones.
Following the narrative part we proceeded to the
empirical analysis. Because inflation behavior is central to
analysis of transmission mechanism, the choice of inflation
indicator is very important to subsequent research. In
view of considerable noise in price data during transition
we decided not to use the conventional CPI. Rather, we
made use of core inflation indices that are less prone to
short term reversible supply shocks and thus better indi-
cate the general price trend. However, no single core
inflation definition prevails and so we had to choose
among several available series for each countries. We
based the selection process on the commonly used crite-
ria, such as stability, unbiasedness, attraction and exogeni-
ty. Inflation as well as other variables used in subsequent
analysis (industrial production, interest rates, euro
exchange rates) were first checked for the level of inte-
gration and then crucial interactions among the variables
were investigated.
In this paper we decided to restrict ourselves to study-
ing two major transmission channels: exchange rate channel
and interest rate channel and their pass-through on inflation
and output. Far from describing the complete transmission
mechanism, these channels are easily identifiable and are
operating in all countries in the panel. Analysing other chan-
nels, such as expectations or credit channel, is likely to pose
considerable problems with finding comparable data and
making cross-country inferences. 
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We began our analysis by testing conventional Granger
causality to find out to what extend interest rates and
exchange rates have an impact on inflation and output. To
capture the dynamic pattern of the relationships we run the
tests in a 3-year rolling windows. The analysis confirmed
previous findings about on the relative importance of inter-
est and exchange rate channels. For most countries
exchange rate channel is stronger and much more stable
than the interest rate channel. 
As a next step we tried to find cointegration in the sys-
tem of 4 above-mentioned  augmented by European Union
producer price index, industrial output and interest rates.
For all countries except Estonia and Slovenia we found evi-
dence of the exsitence of cointegrating relationships which
suggests that there is a systematic interaction between vari-
ables in the long run . Further tests indicated that we could
identify 2 or 3 such relationships depending on the country. 
Empirical analysis was concluded by investigation of
impulse response functions that shed light on how inflation
and industrial output reacted to surprise changes in key pol-
icy variables, i.e. interest rates and exchange rates. For most
countries, again, responses of inflation were consistent with
the theory, i.e. it was dampened by interest rate rise and
boosted by exchange rate depreciation. Output was boost-
ed by depreciation in the majority of countries while other
respones strongly vary by country.
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